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ABSTRACT
In the corporate governance debate, the short-term versus longterm contention has grown into perhaps today’s most controversial topic.
In this debate, descriptions of institutional investors tend to present a
dichotomic nature. These investors are alternatively portrayed as
homogenously short-termist or as consistent “forces for good,” focused on
targeting underperforming companies. This Article moves beyond this
dichotomy. It shows empirically that aggregate institutional investor
behavior presents nuances that depend on a variety of factors, including
individual firm characteristics, institutional ownership levels, and
institutional propensity toward activism.
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INTRODUCTION
The rise of empowered shareholders has introduced a novel, intertemporal dimension in the fundamental corporate law debate over the
appropriate division of authority between a corporation’s board of
directors and its shareholders. Among empowered shareholders,
institutional investors in particular have catalyzed the attention of
corporate law scholars since the early 1990s. Back then, commentators
began to report a steady increase in institutional investor ownership,1 with
many suggesting that this development would be the dawn of a new era of
shareholder empowerment.2 While the process took longer than initially
thought, and involved regulatory developments in addition to market
changes, that era is now upon us. Shareholders, and especially large
institutional investors, stand today as empowered as ever, having gained
the ability to influence a firm’s business and investment policy in a
substantial manner.3
Sharp disagreement, however, occurs when it comes to assessing
the consequences of this change in the fact pattern. Defenders of the
traditional board-centric model of the corporation argue that shareholder
empowerment exacerbates short-termist issues, incentivizing companies
to undertake courses of action that are profitable in the short term but
value-decreasing in the long term.4 On the contrary, shareholder
1. See Bernard S. Black, Shareholder Passivity Reexamined, 89 MICH. L. REV. 520, 570 (1990).
2. See Bernard S. Black, Agents Watching Agents: The Promise of Institutional Investor Voice,
39 UCLA L. REV. 811, 827–31 (1991). See generally Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier Kraakman,
Reinventing the Outside Director: An Agenda for Institutional Investors, 43 STAN. L. REV. 863 (1991).
3. See Stephen M. Bainbridge, Preserving Director Primacy by Managing Shareholder
Interventions, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON SHAREHOLDER POWER 231 (Jennifer G. Hill & Randall
S. Thomas eds., 2015); William W. Bratton & Michael L. Wachter, The Case Against Shareholder
Empowerment, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 655, 662 (2010).
4. See Stephen M. Bainbridge, Response, Director Primacy and Shareholder Disempowerment,
119 HARV. L. REV. 1735, 1736–44 (2006); Martin Lipton, Takeover Bids in the Target’s Boardroom,
35 BUS. L. 101, 104 (1979); Michael E. Porter, Capital Choices: Changing the Way America Invests
in Industry, J. APPLIED CORP. FIN., Summer 1992, at 4.
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advocates praise the rise of shareholder empowerment as the longawaited correction to the moral hazard problem arising out of the
separation of ownership from control, while downplaying short-termism
concerns as overstated.5
This Article examines the role played by institutional investors—
which today comprise banks, insurance companies, mutual funds,
investment advisors, brokers, pension funds, endowments, and hedge
funds—within the short-term versus long-term debate in corporate
governance. Current descriptions of institutional investor behavior tend to
present a dichotomic nature, with such investors being portrayed either as
homogenously short-termist or as consistent “forces for good,” focused on
targeting underperforming companies. Our aim is to move beyond this
dichotomy, using empirical tools to provide a more exact taxonomy of
institutional investor behavior along the two crucial dimensions of
institutional investors’ investment horizons and activism. Further, while
our work relates to recent empirical studies examining hedge fund
behavior,6 it essentially focuses on aggregate institutional behavior.
We begin our empirical investigation by examining the time trends
in institutional ownership’s levels, holding periods, turnover, and activism
over the past thirty-five years (from 1980 to 2015). Somewhat
surprisingly, we find that while institutional investor ownership has
significantly increased throughout the years, institutional investors as a
whole seem to have grown more patient and less active. A possible
explanation for these results is the concurrent rise of passive investment
approaches, including index funds and exchange-traded funds.
Our next step is to examine what factors can explain cross-sectional
differences in institutional investors’ investment horizons and activism, as
the empirical finding that institutional investors have become more patient
and less active runs contrary to common assumptions about institutional
ownership. Our findings indicate that among our independent variables,
time-invariant firm characteristics captured by firm-fixed effects explain
most of the cross-sectional variation in institutional holding periods and
activism (i.e., our dependent variables).
5. See Lucian A. Bebchuk, The Myth that Insulating Boards Serves Long-Term Value, 113
COLUM. L. REV. 1637, 1651 (2013) [hereinafter Bebchuk, The Myth]; Mark J. Roe, Corporate ShortTermism--In the Boardroom and in the Courtroom, 68 BUS. L. 977, 1004 (2013).
6. See Lucian A. Bebchuk et al., The Long-Term Effects of Hedge Fund Activism, 115 COLUM.
L. REV. 1085, 1106–14 (2015) [hereinafter Bebchuck et al., Long-Term Effects] (documenting a
positive effect of hedge fund activism on firm value in both the short term and the long term). But see
K.J. Martijn Cremers et al., Hedge Fund Activism and Long-Term Firm Value (Dec. 14, 2015)
(unpublished
manuscript),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2693231
(documenting that the positive short-term effect of hedge funds on firm value is reversed in the long
term).
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We next focus on the individual firm characteristics included in our
set, obtaining the four following results. First, higher firm value (as
proxied by Tobin’s Q7) predicts shorter institutional holding periods and
correspondingly higher stock turnover while also being correlated with
less activism. This seemingly indicates that as firm value increases,
institutional investors trade stock more frequently, perhaps to exploit
profit opportunities.
Second, we find that, while the adoption of a staggered board8 does
not impact any of our measures of institutional investor behavior, poison
pills9 predict increased short-termism because their adoption is associated
with shorter institutional holding periods and higher trading frequency.
Consistent with results we obtained in prior research,10 this difference
between staggered boards and poison pills could be explained by the
different nature of these defensive measures.
The adoption of a staggered board requires shareholder approval and
therefore reflects agreement between the board and shareholders. Boards
can instead unilaterally adopt the poison pill without any dialectical
confrontation with the shareholders. Based on this fundamental
distinction, we have argued elsewhere that staggered boards serve a
positive governance function because the agreed-upon limits they impose
on the ability of shareholders to interfere with board decision-making help
address informational inefficiencies and commit shareholders to the
creation of long-term firm value.11 Conversely, because of their unilateral
nature, poison pills are more likely to be motivated by managerial moral
hazard. This could explain why institutional investors react negatively to
the adoption of a poison pill but remain indifferent to the adoption of a
staggered board.12
Third, having more outstanding equity owned by active institutional
investors considerably reduces the institutional investment horizon—that
7. Tobin’s Q is the ratio of the market value of assets to the book value of assets. See Eugene F.
Fama & Kenneth R. French, Testing Trade-Off and Pecking Order Predictions About Dividends and
Debt, 15 REV. FIN. STUD. 1, 8 (2002).
8. Unlike in a unitary board, in a staggered board, directors are grouped into different classes,
with each class of directors standing for reelection in successive years. Typically, staggered boards
have three classes of directors—the maximum number of classes most states permit—with directors
in each class being elected to three-year terms. See K.J. Martijn Cremers & Simone M. Sepe, The
Shareholder Value of Empowered Boards, 68 STAN. L. REV. 67, 77 (2016).
9. A poison pill consists of stock purchase rights that are granted to existing shareholders in the
event a corporate raider accumulates more than a certain threshold of outstanding stock and entitle
the existing shareholders (but not the raider) to acquire newly issued stock at a substantial discount
from the market price.
10. K.J. Martijn Cremers, Saura Masconale & Simone M. Sepe, Commitment and Entrenchment
in Corporate Governance, 110 NW. U. L. REV. 727, 732, 761–71 (2016) (showing that defensive
measures benefit shareholders as long as such measures provide for shareholder approval).
11. See id. at 768–70; see also Cremers & Sepe, supra note 8, at 123–26.
12. See Cremers, Masconale & Sepe, supra note 10.
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is, it is associated with shorter holding periods and increased stock
turnover. Further, higher institutional ownership levels are associated with
both shorter holding periods and greater activism. These results seem to
support the claims of board advocates that increased shareholder activism
is likely to exacerbate short-termist concerns. Indeed, active investors
would enjoy greater bargaining power to influence a firm’s investment
policy horizons, and this power would increase with the level of
outstanding stock held by institutional investors.
Fourth, firm age is associated with longer holding periods, less
turnover, and less activism, suggesting that the degree of informational
asymmetry affecting a specific corporation plays an important role in
predicting institutional investor behavior. Investors in older firms are
likely to gather more private information about these firms over time. This
could explain why institutional investors tend to have longer investment
horizons in such firms, as well as interfere less with management.
Alternatively, it could be that the longer a firm exists, the more likely it is
that the firm is included in some benchmark index, which would explain
the presence of more patient investors and less active owners.
Next, to examine the efficiency questions raised by aggregate
institutional investor behavior, we estimate Tobin’s Q regressions on yearand firm-fixed effects, proxies for institutional investor holding periods
and activism, staggered boards, poison pills, and a set of standard controls.
Consistent again with the results we documented in prior studies,13 we find
that the adoption of a staggered board is associated with increased firm
value. Most importantly, for the present discussion, we also find that such
a positive effect of staggered boards is considerably stronger in firms
where institutional investors exhibit longer investment horizons. This
finding supports the view that a main mechanism through which the
staggered board adds value is by ensuring that investors give managers
sufficient time to develop latent assets (i.e., long-term strategies), rather
than evaluating management performance after relatively brief periods of
time.
Conversely, the adoption of a poison pill continues to be negatively
associated with firm value, even when institutional investors are more
patient, adding to our inference that the unilateral nature of poison pills
make this defense more likely to be a reflection of managerial moral
hazard.
13. See K.J. Martijn Cremers, Lubomir Litov & Simone M. Sepe, Staggered Boards and LongTerm Firm Value, Revisited, 126 J. FIN. ECON. 422 (2017); Cremers & Sepe, supra note 8, at 100–08
(producing novel empirical evidence that challenges prior cross-sectional studies on the negative
impact of staggered boards on firm value and showing that staggered boards are positively associated
with firm value in the long term).
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Finally, we find that when investors have longer investment horizons
but are more active, the positive effect of the staggered board on firm value
decreases. This finding is consistent with our theory that the value added
through the adoption of a staggered board is the commitment of both
boards and shareholders to long-term value creation. A staggered board
serves this function by allowing the board to pursue long-term investments
in an environment conducive to stable relationships with both shareholders
and stakeholders. However, when a substantial fraction of the firm’s
institutional investors are active and thus more likely to pursue short-term
changes, this challenges the conditions that are required for the staggered
board to serve its commitment function.
Overall, our study generates insights on the short-term versus longterm debate in corporate governance, showing that far from the debate’s
polarized rendering of homogenously “good” or “bad” institutional
investors, aggregate institutional investor behavior presents nuances that
depend on a variety of factors, including individual firm characteristics,
institutional ownership levels, and institutional propensity toward
activism.
This Article continues as follows. Part I frames the terms of the shortterm and long-term debate in corporate governance, reviewing competing
theoretical positions and both their economic underpinnings and policy
implications. Part II begins our empirical investigation of institutional
investor behavior, examining time trends in institutional ownership levels,
holding periods, turnover, and activism. Part III investigates the factors
that predict institutional investors’ shorter or longer holding periods and
more or less activism. Part IV examines the value implications of
institutional investor behavior. Part V offers some conclusive remarks.
THE SHORT-TERM VERSUS LONG-TERM DEBATE
Inter-temporal issues have captured scholarly attention since the
writings of philosophers David Hume and Jeremy Bentham.14 In the
corporate context, such issues first emerged during the takeover era of the
1980s, when rational (as opposed to behavioral) myopia studies made their
appearance in financial economics theory. Departing from mainstream
neoclassical models, rational myopia studies suggested that an excessive
focus on stock market results, combined with informational asymmetries,

14. See Kevin J. Laverty, Economic “Short-Termism”: The Debate, the Unresolved Issues, and
the Implications for Management Practice and Research, 21 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 825, 828 (1996).
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could induce managers to privilege short-term gains over long-term
returns, with short-termism potentially threatening economic decline.15
Concerns about inter-temporal choices then faded away during the
bull market of the 1990s and early 2000s, only to move to the center stage
of corporate governance discussions in the wake of the financial crisis of
2008. On the one hand, the near collapse of the U.S. financial system and
the rise of empowered shareholders have revived claims that shorttermism in response to market and shareholder pressure is a first-order
governance problem that demands regulatory correction.16 On the other,
shareholder advocates argue that short-termism is “insufficiently strong,
empirically and theoretically, to affect corporate rulemaking,” defending
the classic view that market prices are fairly information-efficient.17
The short-term versus long-term contention has grown today into
perhaps the most controversial debate in corporate governance. This Part
provides the background necessary for understanding the context and
importance of this debate, clarifying the different economic approaches to
short-termism in the corporate context, as well as the debate’s wideranging policy implications.
A.

Short-Termism: Arguments and Counterarguments
1. Economic Literature

Rational myopia provides the classical economic argument
underpinning claims of short-termism in the corporate context. Two
variations of this argument exist: “managerial myopia,” where shorttermism is a form of management opportunism, and “market myopia,”
where short-termism is a consequence of asset pricing inefficiencies.
Informational asymmetry, however, rests at the core of both myopia
models.
15. See, e.g., M.P. Narayanan, Managerial Incentives for Short-Term Results, 40 J. FIN. 1469,
1470 (1985) (“By selecting a project that yields short-term profits, the manager can expect to improve
the perception about her ability . . . .”); Jeremy C. Stein, Efficient Capital Markets, Inefficient Firms:
A Model of Myopic Corporate Behavior, 104 Q. J. ECON. 655, 667 (1989) [hereinafter Stein, Efficient
Capital Markets] (modeling suboptimal investments where managers maximize a weighted average
of near-term stock prices and long-run value); Jeremy C. Stein, Takeover Threats and Managerial
Myopia, 96 J. POL. ECON. 61, 63–67 (1988) [hereinafter Stein, Managerial Myopia] (showing formally
that managers threatened by a takeover will sell underpriced assets).
16. See, e.g., Jack B. Jacobs, “Patient Capital”: Can Delaware Corporate Law Help Revive It?,
68 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1645 (2011); Leo E. Strine, Jr., Can We Do Better by Ordinary Investors?
A Pragmatic Reaction to the Dueling Ideological Mythologists of Corporate Law, 114 COLUM. L.
REV. 449, 450–51 (2014).
17. See Roe, supra note 5, at 1004. See generally Bebchuk, The Myth, supra note 5.
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Models of managerial myopia explore the distorted incentives of
privately informed managers for inter-temporal choices that are
individually optimal, but detrimental to shareholder and firm value. For
example, managers may prefer projects that deliver short-term returns at
the expense of long-term firm profitability because short-term returns are
viewed as helpful to enhance the manager’s reputation,18 signal her
superior ability in the labor market,19 or address issues of adverse
selection.20
Conversely, models of stock market myopia focus on the shorttermist distortions that arise from the informational asymmetry between
managers and investors, which may cause market prices to fail to fully
incorporate the value of long-term projects (or what Brennan refers to as
“latent assets”21) in the short-term horizon.22 As a result, to avoid
shareholder retribution (whether through managerial removal or a change
in control) for what may appear as short-term underperformance,
managers may trade off long-term cash flows for short-term stock price
gains.23
In practice, however, managerial myopia models and stock market
myopia models tend to be complements rather than substitutes, with stock
market’s short-termism reinforcing managerial short-termism and vice
versa. For this reason, this Article conflates these alternative myopia
characterizations into the unifying category of “myopia studies.”
Unlike rational myopia scholars, defendants of the traditionally
dominant view that market prices are fairly information-efficient argue
that short-termist concerns have no, or at best little, room in corporate
governance.24 Under this view, competitive markets optimize the trade-off
between short-term performance and long-term investments,25 as stock
prices are “generally set at levels representing the best estimate of longterm share value that can be derived from all available public
information.”26 This means that any course of action that is profitable in
18. See, e.g., Bengt Holmstrom & Joan Ricart I Costa, Managerial Incentives and Capital
Management, 101 Q. J. ECON. 835 (1986); Narayanan, supra note 15, at 1470.
19. See Tim S. Campbell & Anthony M. Marino, Myopic Investment Decisions and Competitive
Labor Markets, 35 INT’L ECON. REV. 855 (1994).
20. Simone M. Sepe, Board and Shareholder Power, Revisited, 101 MINN. L. REV. 1377, 1395–
1419 (2017) (examining the adverse selection issues arising in the shareholder–manager relationship).
21. See Michael J. Brennan, Latent Assets, 45 J. FIN. 709 (1990).
22. See generally Kenneth A. Froot et al., Herd on the Street: Informational Inefficiencies in a
Market with Short-Term Speculation, 47 J. FIN. 1461 (1992); Stewart C. Myers & Nicholas S. Majluf,
Corporate Financing and Investment Decisions When Firms Have Information that Investors Do Not
Have, 13 J. FIN. ECON. 187 (1984).
23. See, e.g., Stein, Efficient Capital Markets, supra note 15, at 667.
24. See, e.g., Roe, supra note 5, at 1004.
25. See Michael C. Jensen, The Takeover Controversy: Analysis and Evidence, 4 MIDLAND
CORP. FIN. J., Summer 1986, at 6.
26. Bebchuk, The Myth, supra note 5, at 1661–62.
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the long term will also tend to be profitable in the short term.
Correspondently, any course of action that is bad in the long term can be
expected to have similar negative effects in the short term.
Two basic policy implications follow from these assumptions. First,
maximizing today’s stock price is the best means to maximize a firm’s
long-term value. Second, optimal inter-temporal choices are a condition
for maximizing stock price. Therefore, when we observe, for example, a
failure to invest in long-term projects, this choice should not be taken as a
proxy of underinvestment in the long term, but rather as a valuemaximizing decision that reflects a lack of good long-term investment
opportunities.
2. Law & Economics Literature
In the law and economics literature, the dominant explanation for
short-termism focuses on liquidity needs rather than informational
asymmetry. Under this explanation, short-termism results from the risk
that “impatient” shareholders with short-term liquidity needs—and,
therefore, a tendency to discount future gains and focus on short-term
performance—might pressure companies to undertake investments that
are lucrative in the short term, but value decreasing in the long run.27
Although this explanation for short-termism has points in common
with models of stock market myopia, it is important to emphasize that
those models conceive of short-termism as a pervasive problem that
potentially affects all shareholders. In contrast, the “impatient capital”
explanation characterizes short-termist preferences as an issue affecting
only a subset of investors. In particular, scholars have focused on
institutional investors, as they have high turnover rates (to avoid holding
large, undiversified blocks of stock28) and are under constant pressure to
beat competitors.29 More recently, among institutional investors, the

27. It appears that the first commentator to raise short-termism concerns was Martin Lipton. See
Martin Lipton, Takeover Bids in the Target’s Boardroom, 35 BUS. L. 101, 104–05 (1979); see also
William T. Allen & Leo E. Strine, Jr., When the Existing Economic Order Deserves a Champion: The
Enduring Relevance of Martin Lipton’s Vision of the Corporate Law, 60 BUS. L. 1383, 1383–84 (2005)
(attributing to Lipton the view that traded securities are frequently mispriced). In more recent times,
short-termism concerns have been raised by academics, organizational leaders, business columnists,
corporate lawyers, and business organizations. See Bebchuk, The Myth, supra note 5, at 1639–40 nn.2–
6, 7–11 (collecting the most important contributions expressing short-termism concerns).
28. See S.M. Loescher, Bureaucratic Measurement, Shuttling Stock Shares, and Shortened Time
Horizons: Implications for Economic Growth, 24 Q. REV. ECON. & BUS. 8, 9 (1984).
29. See Ronald J. Gilson & Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Agency Costs of Agency Capitalism: Activist
Investors and the Revaluation of Governance Rights, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 863, 889–90 (2013)
(describing the competitive-pressure mechanisms that affect the performance of institutional
investors).
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spotlight has been on hedge funds, whose business model is commonly
oriented towards short-term gains.30
In response, shareholder advocates argue that while institutional
investors, including hedge funds, may occasionally raise short-termist
concerns, the benefits arising from these investors’ activism and ability to
efficiently exploit governance levers largely outweigh such concerns.31
For shareholder advocates, activist institutional investors are the
champions of the long-dormant shareholder franchise who, as the
corporation’s residual claimants, are best positioned to control the firstorder problem of managerial moral hazard.32 Further, these scholars also
reject the claim that activist institutional investors are at an informational
disadvantage relative to boards of directors, arguing that this claim fails to
take into account the increased sophistication of today’s investors. Indeed,
institutional investors—and, in particular, hedge funds—would possess
both the incentives and the resources to act as “governance entrepreneurs”
that specialize in monitoring and providing governance and strategic
inputs.33 And they could also rely on proxy advisory firms, which
increasingly act as “central coordinating and information agents” to gather
information regarding governance at particular firms.34
B.

The Legal Stakes

The short-term versus long-term debate has wide-ranging legal
implications. First and foremost, this debate has reignited discussions
about the optimal allocation of power between boards and shareholders.
Critics of short-termism argue that protecting the traditional boardcentric model of the corporation—by ensuring that directors are insulated
from the pressure of activists—is necessary to prevent shareholders with
excessive short-termist preferences from steering the corporation toward
an unproductive short-term perspective.35 Enhanced board protection
would be the most urgent in the current corporate scenario, where

30. See Marcel Kahan & Edward B. Rock, Hedge Funds in Corporate Governance and
Corporate Control, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 1021, 1083 (2007) (“Hedge funds come close to being the
archetypal short-term investor. For some funds, holding shares for a full day represents a ‘long-term’
investment.”) (internal citation omitted).
31. See Bebchuk et al., Long-Term Effects, supra note 6, at 1089.
32. See Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The End of History for Corporate Law, 89
GEO. L.J. 439, 449 (2001) (“[I]f the control rights granted to the firm’s equity-holders are exclusive
and strong, they will have powerful incentives to maximize the value of the firm.”).
33. See Gilson & Gordon, supra note 29, at 897.
34. See Marcel Kahan & Edward Rock, Embattled CEOs, 88 TEX. L. REV. 987, 1007 (2010).
35. See, e.g., Cremers & Sepe, supra note 8, at 136–41.
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shareholders have grown increasingly empowered 36 as a result of changes
in both market practices and the regulatory landscape.37
On the shareholder side, scholars rebut the urgency of short-termist
concerns, which they view as “complicating factors” threatening to revert
us to an inefficient system of opportunistic management insulation and
shareholder disempowerment.38 Further, they contend, available empirical
studies are decidedly unsupportive of both claims of pervasive shorttermism and the alleged benefits that management insulation would offer
as a remedy to such concerns.39 In particular, contrary to what is argued
by short-termist critics, the adoption of defensive measures—such as the
staggered board and the poison pill—would be detrimental to shareholder
and firm value, while hedge fund activism would increase firm value in
both the short and long term.40
For quite some time, shareholder advocates have been rather
successful in employing empirical studies to advance the idea that a
shareholder-centric model of the corporation is superior to a board-centric
model.41 This explains, at least in part, the developments observed in
market practices in the past decade and the regulatory reforms that were
introduced to promote shareholder empowerment. The changes that
occurred in the use of defensive measures provide perhaps the most telling
evidence to this respect.42 While directors theoretically have a veto power
over decisions to destagger boards, in recent years they have increasingly
acquiesced to destaggering proposals under the pressure exerted by both
proxy advisors and activist shareholders.43 The use of the poison pill has

36. See Martin Lipton et al., Some Thoughts for Boards of Directors in 2016, HARV. L. SCH. F.
(Dec. 9, 2015), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2015/12/09/
some-thoughts-for-boards-of -directors-in-2016 [https://perma.cc/9G8T-Z3JU].
37. Capital market changes have included the growth of shareholder concentration and
activism, the rise of activist hedge funds, the emergence of proxy advisory firms, new universal
majority voting and accompanying withhold campaigns, and the growing use and success of
shareholder proposals. See Cremers & Sepe, supra note 8, at 85. Regulatory reforms have
accompanied these changes, including amendments to proxy filing requirements that facilitate the
use of shareholder proposals, amendments to the Delaware General Corporation Law that grant
shareholders greater access to the ballot box, and most recently, the introduction of say-on-pay
shareholder votes and a further expansion of the scope of shareholder proposals to effect changes in
corporate election procedures. See id. at 86.
38. See Bebchuk, supra note 5, at 1651; Roe, supra note 5, at 1004–05.
39. See Bebchuk, supra note 5, at 1644, 1686–87.
40. See id. at 1652–56 (arguing that the available empirical evidence documents a negative effect
of defensive measures on firm value); Bebchuk et al., supra note 6, at 1090 (documenting evidence
against the alleged reversal of the positive effect of hedge fund activism in the long term).
41. See Cremers, Masconale & Sepe, supra note 10, at 744–45.
42. See Sepe, supra note 20, at 1394–95.
43. See Cremers & Sepe, supra note 8, at 98–99 (documenting that lower staggered board
levels over time are largely due to increased destaggering rather than a fall in staggering events).
ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG.
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similarly declined—again, largely as a result of the war waged against it
by proxy advisors and activist investors.44
In more recent times, however, short-termist critics have produced
new evidence that challenges prior economic studies, suggesting that, at
least for some firms, board protection from shareholder and market
pressure may be value increasing, while enhanced shareholder activism
may have detrimental consequences.45 These studies have accordingly
prompted (or in some cases, revived) reform proposals designed to reempower boards—vis-à-vis shareholders—including proposals to grant
directors terms of three or five years,46 enhance the voting rights of longterm holders,47 impose sticky default rules that embed staggered boards,48
and regulate the voting choices of money managers.49
INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR BEHAVIOR: AN OVERVIEW

44. Stephen M. Gill et al., Structural Defenses to Shareholder Activism, 47 REV. SEC. &
COMMODITIES REG. 151, 170 n.162 (2014) (“Whereas 57% of the S&P 500 companies had poison
pills at the end of 2003, only 7% had pills in place at the end of 2013.”) (internal citation omitted).
45. See, e.g., K.J. Martijn Cremers, Saura Masconale & Simone M. Sepe, Activist Hedge Funds
and the Corporation, 94 WASH. U. L. REV. 261, 298–303 (2017) (documenting that hedge fund
activism is not associated to reduced agency costs while it is associated to increased risk taking);
William C. Johnson, Jonathan M. Karpoff & Sangho Yi, The Bonding Hypothesis of Takeover
Defenses: Evidence from IPO Firms, 117 J. FIN. ECON. 307, 308 (2015) (showing that staggered
boards have a positive effect on firm value in young firms with important stakeholder relationships);
David F. Larcker, Gaizka Ormazabal & Daniel J. Taylor, The Market Reaction to Corporate
Governance Regulation, 101 J. FIN. ECON. 431, 433 (2011) (showing a negative stock return around
proposal announcements for proxy access reform, including a proposal to eliminate staggered boards,
which is “inconsistent with the market viewing the elimination of staggered boards as value
increasing”); Cremers & Sepe, supra note 8 (documenting a value-increasing effect of staggered
boards); Cremers, Litov & Sepe, supra note 13 (producing additional empirical tests on the valueincreasing effect of staggered boards); Cremers et al., supra note 6 (empirically challenging the view
that hedge fund activism is beneficial in the long term).
46. William T. Allen, Jack B. Jacobs & Leo E. Strine, Jr., The Great Takeover Debate: A
Mediation on Bridging the Conceptual Divide, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1067, 1097 (2002) (proposing a
triennial board election); Martin Lipton & Steven A. Rosenblum, A New System of Corporate
Governance: The Quinquennial Election of Directors, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 187, 225–30 (1991)
(proposing a quinquennial board election); Jacobs, supra note 16, at 1648, 1662 (proposing a
quinquennial board election).
47. See, e.g., COLIN MAYER, FIRM COMMITMENT: WHY THE CORPORATION IS FAILING US AND
HOW TO RESTORE TRUST IN IT (2013) (proposing greater voting rights for long-term shareholders);
Patrick Bolton & Frédéric Samama, L-Shares: Rewarding Long-Term Investors 3, 39 (European Corp.
Governance Inst., Finance Working Paper No. 342/2013, 2013), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=2188661## (proposing option grants to shareholders made exercisable only
after holder meets long-term ownership time threshold).
48. See Cremers & Sepe, supra note 8, at 137–41 (proposing a default rule favoring staggered
boards that can be removed only by the board of directors).
49. See Strine, Jr., supra note 16, at 450–51 (requiring index funds and mutual funds to vote their
shares to support long-term value creation).
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In our prior work, we examined explanations for short-termism based
on informational asymmetry, which produced theoretical and empirical
results that are consistent with the view that short-termist concerns are
real.50 In this Article, we proceed in another direction, focusing on
impatient capital explanations and in particular, examining empirically the
aggregate behavior of institutional investors. Two main reasons motivate
our research. First, we maintain that short-termist explanations based on
myopia studies may coexist with impatient capital explanations and in fact,
overlap. Second, despite the fierce debate around the alleged virtues or
vices of institutional investors in corporate governance, the law and
economics literature has paid relatively little attention to the aggregate
behavior of these investors so far, relying more on theoretical predictions
than empirical research.
In this Part, after presenting our dataset, we begin our empirical
analysis of aggregate institutional investor behavior by describing the time
trends in institutional ownership over the past three decades.
A.

Data Description

We use several proxies to capture the different dimensions of
aggregate institutional investor behavior. For institutional investors’
holding durations, we use three proxies: Institutional Duration,
Institutional Portfolio Duration, and Institutional Turnover. All three
proxies are derived from Thomson-Reuters and based on the 13F
institutional holdings reports (13F forms) that institutional investors are
required to file quarterly. For institutional investor activism, we use one
proxy: Institutional Active Share.
The first proxy of institutional investors’ holding durations,
Institutional Duration, measures how long the current institutional owners
have held that particular stock in their portfolio over the last five years
(averaged by each institution’s share ownership in the stock).51 Therefore,
Institutional Duration only considers how long institutions have held a
particular stock in their respective portfolios, irrespective of how long they
hold any of the other stocks in their portfolio. This proxy captures the
evidence that institutions might be short-term in some stocks and longterm in other stocks, reflecting the fact that, at many large institutions,

50. See, e.g., Cremers & Sepe, supra note 8 (producing empirical evidence that the adoption of
a staggered board is beneficial to address short-termist concerns); Sepe, supra note 20 (showing
theoretically that the problem of adverse selection makes short-termism a pervasive problem).
51. This measure was first introduced in a 2015 study by K.J. Martijn Cremers and Ankur Pareek.
See K.J. Martijn Cremers & Ankur Pareek, Short-Term Trading and Stock Return Anomalies:
Momentum, Reversal, and Share Issuance, 19 REV. FIN. 1649, 1650–51 (2015).
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different portfolio managers make investment decisions for very different
reasons.
The second proxy, Institutional Portfolio Duration, measures how
long the current institutional owners have held stocks in general (not just
the particular stock in question) in their portfolio over the last five years
(averaged by each institution’s share ownership in the stock). Institutional
Portfolio Duration is first calculated at the level of each institution, based
on how long the aggregate institutional portfolio has held all of its stocks
over the past five years, averaged by the portfolio weights in each stock.
Therefore, this proxy characterizes the whole institutional portfolio rather
than only the institution’s behavior in the particular stock in question.
Institutional Portfolio Duration is then calculated as the weighted average
of this institutional holding duration across all institutions owning the
stock.52 While the 13F holdings reports start in 1980, we require at least
three years of institutional holdings reports before including the
institution, such that both the Institutional Duration and Institutional
Portfolio Duration data series’ start in 1983, and, like all the proxies we
use in our analysis, end in 2015.
The third proxy, Institutional Turnover, calculates the amount of
trading done by the current institutional owners as an average percentage
of quarterly portfolio holding changes in the past year (averaged by each
institution’s share ownership in the stock). This proxy is the most widely
used for institutional trading frequency and is similar to the inverse of
Institutional Portfolio Duration. A distinction of Institutional Turnover is
that it does not matter which of the total assets are turned over but only
how many of the institutional assets are turned over. As a result, this proxy
does not distinguish between turnover where the institution sells shares it
acquired only in the previous quarter versus where the institution sells
shares it acquired ten years ago.53 In contrast, this difference is taken into
account when calculating Institutional Portfolio Duration.54 Therefore,
two funds may have the same Institutional Turnover but very different
Institutional Portfolio Duration.55
52. This measure was first introduced in a 2016 study by K.J. Martin Cremers and Ankur Pareek.
See K.J. Martin Cremers & Ankur Pareek, Patient Capital Outperformance: The Investment Skill of
High Active Share Managers Who Trade Infrequently, 122 J. FIN. ECON. 288, 291–92 (2016).
53. Id.
54. For a detailed discussion and comparison of these measures of investment time horizons as
applied to mutual funds rather than institutional investors, see Anne M. Tucker, The Long & The Short:
An Empirical Study of Mutual Fund Investment Time Horizons, 43 J. CORP. L. (forthcoming 2017).
55. For example, consider an institution that never trades 75% of its portfolio and turns over
the remaining 25% of its portfolio each quarter, such that it has an annualized turnover of 100% per
year. This turnover would be the same as an institution that turns over the full portfolio once a year.
However, the former portfolio would have a long holding duration, on average, while the latter
portfolio would have a holding duration of one year only.
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Finally, Institutional Active Share is a proxy of the percentage
difference between the overall holdings’ weights of the current
institutional owners and market weights. We first calculate the active share
of each institution owning a particular stock, using their overall portfolio,
and then average over each institution’s share ownership in the stock.
Active share is the percentage of weights in the portfolio that differ from
the weights in the portfolio’s benchmark. For example, an active share of
50% indicates that half of the portfolio’s weights completely overlap with
the weights in the portfolio’s benchmark. In assigning benchmarks to each
institutional portfolio, we select the benchmark for which the institutional
portfolio has the lowest active share out of a large set of potential
benchmarks used by U.S. mutual funds.56 As a result, the assigned
benchmark has the largest overlap with the institutional portfolio across
all reasonable, frequently used U.S. equity benchmarks.
B.

Time Trends in Institutional Ownership

In this Section, we provide a description of the time trends in
institutional ownership over the past thirty-five years, from 1980 to 2015,
focusing on institutional ownership levels, Institutional Duration,
Institutional Turnover, and Institutional Active Share (all as defined in Part
II.A).
1.

Institutional Ownership Levels

As discussed in Part I.B, the growth of institutional ownership is
considered one of the crucial factors contributing to shareholder
empowerment. Accordingly, we begin our analysis by examining the
percentage of outstanding equity held by institutional investors throughout
our sample period, reporting their 50th, 70th, and 90th percentiles,
respectively.
Consistent with prior studies,57 we document that the percentage of
institutional ownership holdings has dramatically increased since 1980. As
shown by Figure 1, if we consider, for example, the 50th percentile (i.e.,
the median) of institutional ownership holdings, the median was only 6%
in 1980. This means that as of 1980, half the outstanding stocks had
institutional ownership of 6% or below, and the other half had institutional
ownership above 6%. The median progressively escalated to around 30%
56. This measure was first introduced in a 2009 study by K.J. Martijn Cremers and Antti
Petajisto. See K.J. Martijn Cremers & Antti Petajisto, How Active Is Your Fund Manager? A New
Measure that Predicts Performance, 22 REV. FIN. STUD. 3329 (2009).
57. See, e.g., Black, supra note 1; Kahan & Rock, supra note 34, at 987.
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at the beginning of the 1990s and then further increased through the 1990s
and 2000s up to a record high of 81% in 2012.
The pattern in the 70th percentile of institutional ownership holdings
is similar, with the 70th percentile being around 27% in the early 1980s
and up to around 90% in 2010. Likewise, the 90th percentile of
institutional ownership increased from 46% in 1980 to 99% in 2009.
Figure 1
Institutional Ownership Holdings
Figure 1 plots the 50th, 70th, and 90th percentiles (perc.) of the percentage of
outstanding equity held by institutional owners, as derived from the ThomsonReuters 13F quarterly institutional holdings reports for the period 1980–2015.

2. Institutional Duration
Next, we consider our first proxy of how long institutional investors
hold stocks in their portfolios: Institutional Duration, which measures the
weighted average length of time (in years) that investors have held a given
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stock over the past five years. A common claim in the impatient capital
explanation for short-termism is that institutional investors have evolved
into short-term traders. Investigating whether Institutional Duration has
changed in the past three decades is thus important to verify the potential
for distortions due to the presence of short-term institutional investors.58
As shown by Figure 2 below—and contrary to commonly held
beliefs—Institutional Duration has increased since the 1980s. For
example, the 50th percentile of Institutional Duration has lengthened from
1.38 years in 1983 to 1.93 years in 2015. Consistently, the 70th percentile
of Institutional Duration has lengthened from 1.63 years in 1984 to 2.02
years in 2015.
The increase in Institutional Duration was first documented in a
2016 study by Martijn Cremers and Ankur Pareek.59 This result may seem
surprising in light of the very large increases in share turnover over the
period under examination.60 However, the increased investment horizons
of institutional investors are also evident from the patterns in institutional
turnover. Furthermore, increased investment horizons are consistent with
the patterns in the durations and turnovers of U.S. mutual funds, when one
uses funds’ turnovers that are based on all fund trading61 (rather than only
on quarterly holdings reports as in this paper, which ignores any roundtrip trades done within the quarter). Lengthening institutional investment
horizons are also consistent with the significant increase in passive
investing, and indicate that the large increases in share turnover is caused
by other investors (such as high-frequency traders) rather than the
institutional investors filing 13F holding reports.
Figure 2
Institutional Duration
Figure 2 plots the 50th, 70th, and 90th percentiles (perc.) of Institutional
Duration, which is a proxy of the length of time (in years) that the current
institutional owners have held a particular stock in their portfolio over the last five
years (averaged by each institution’s share ownership in the stock), as derived
from the Thomson-Reuters 13F quarterly institutional holdings reports for the
period 1980–2015.

58. As the distribution of Institutional Portfolio Duration is basically identical to the distribution
of Institutional Duration, we only display the percentiles for Institutional Duration. In the annual
pooled panel, Institutional Duration has correlations of 56% and -43%, respectively, with Institutional
Portfolio Duration and Institutional Turnover.
59. See Cremers & Pareek, supra note 52, at 293.
60. See id. at 294.
61. See id.
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3. Institutional Turnover
To verify the claim that institutional investors have evolved into
short-term traders, we then employ our additional proxy of institutional
investors’ holding periods: Institutional Turnover, which is a measure of
trading frequency based on previous changes in quarter-end holdings.
Consistent with the evidence on Institutional Duration in Figure 2
above, Figure 3 shows that the percentiles of Institutional Turnover have
not changed significantly since the 1980s, supporting the view that
institutional investors have not grown more impatient over time. In fact,
the median Institutional Turnover decreased slightly from 33% per quarter
in 1980 to 27% per quarter in 2015.
Figure 3
Institutional Turnover
Figure 3 plots the 50th, 70th, and 90th percentiles (perc.) of quarterly
Institutional Turnover, which is a proxy of the amount of trading done by the
current institutional owners. Such data is calculated as the average percentage of
quarterly portfolio holding changes in the past year (averaged by each institution’s
share ownership in the stock), as derived from the Thomson-Reuters 13F quarterly
institutional holdings reports for the period 1980–2015.
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Institutional Active Investing

Next, we focus on time trends in institutional investor activism in our
sample period. As a proxy of activism, we use Institutional Active Share,
which is a measure distinguishing between actively managed institutional
holdings and holdings that are fairly similar to market benchmarks.
Indeed, another standard claim underpinning the impatient capital
explanation for short-termism is that greater shareholder activism has
increased the potential for short-termist concerns.62 The claim is that
activist investors—who take significant stakes in target companies,
generally have concentrated portfolios, and thus have a high active share—
are intrinsically better positioned to pressure management toward lucrative
short-term projects at the expense of long-term value.63
62. See, e.g., Leo E. Strine, Jr., One Fundamental Corporate Governance Question We Face:
Can Corporations Be Managed for the Long Term Unless Their Powerful Electorates Also Act and
Think Long Term?, 66 BUS. L. no. 1, 2010, at 1, 8 (2010); Bill George, Activists Seek Short-Term Gain,
Not Long-Term Value, N.Y. TIMES: DEALBOOK (Aug. 26, 2013, 10:56 AM),
https://dealbook.nytimes.com/2013/08/26/activists-seek-short-term-gain-not-long-term-value/
[https://perma.cc/JKK5-Z7NL].
63. See, e.g., ASPEN INST., OVERCOMING SHORT-TERMISM: A CALL FOR A MORE
RESPONSIBLE APPROACH TO INVESTMENT AND BUSINESS MANAGEMENT 2–3 (2009), https://assets.
aspeninstitute.org/content/uploads/files/content/docs/pubs/overcome_short_state0909_0.pdf [https://
perma.cc/YLM2-842N].
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Yet, as shown by Figure 4 below, we find that institutional investor
activism has decreased in the past three decades. For example, the median
Institutional Active Share was 61% in 1980 but dropped to 47% in 2014.
Similarly, the 70th percentile of Institutional Active Share equaled 66% in
1980 but dropped to 52% in 2015. Lastly, in the 90th percentile of
Institutional Active Share, the group of stocks with the most active
institutional investors went from 75% in 1980 to 59% in 2015.
Figure 4
Institutional Active Share
Figure 4 plots the 50th, 70th, and 90th percentiles of Institutional Active
Share, which is a proxy of the percentage difference between the overall holdings
weights of the current institutional owners and market weights. We first calculate
the active share of each institution owning a particular stock, using their overall
portfolio, and then average over each institution’s share ownership in the stock,
as derived from the Thomson-Reuters 13F quarterly institutional holdings reports
for the period 1980–2015.

EXPLAINING INSTITUTIONAL INVESTMENT HORIZONS AND
ACTIVISM
The evidence discussed in Part II indicates that while institutional
investor ownership has significantly increased in the past three decades,
institutional investors seem to have grown more patient and less active.
This finding runs contrary to common assumptions about
institutional investors. Under these assumptions, institutional investors as
a whole would have transitioned from a “defensive” use of corporate
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governance levers to a more proactive use of such levers after the rise of
hedge funds.64
In this Part, we accordingly seek to understand what factors, if any,
can explain institutional holding behavior and activism. We do so by
investigating whether different firm characteristics can predict different
aggregate investor behavior.
A.

Explaining Institutional Duration, Turnover, and Activism

In the attempt to understand what factors might predict institutional
investor behavior, we proceed by estimating R2 values from regressing our
three proxies for institutional investment horizon (Institutional Turnover,
Institutional Duration, and Institutional Portfolio Duration in columns 1–
3, respectively) and activism (Institutional Active Share in column 4) on a
constant plus different fixed effects (year, industry at the 2-digit SIC group
level, firm), or a set of sixteen different firm characteristics (including all
our control variables in Table 2 below, except the proxies for institutional
investor horizon and activism).
An R2 value analysis measures the degree through which the
independent variables in a model explain the dependent variables.
Therefore, this methodology should allow us to better understand how
institutional investor behavior varies depending on exact years, industry
or time-invariant firm characteristics, and specific and time-varying firm
characteristics. Table 1 shows our results.
Table 1
Explaining the Presence of Short-term and Active Institutions
The table presents the R2 of regressing three proxies of institutional
investment horizons (Institutional Turnover, Institutional Duration, and
Institutional Portfolio Duration in columns 1–3, respectively) and our proxy of
institutional investor activism (Institutional Active Share in column 4) on a
constant plus different fixed effects (year, industry at the 2-digit SIC group level,
firm), or a set of sixteen different firm characteristics (see text). Each R2 results
from a different regression.

Included in
regression
Year F.E.

Institutional Institutional Institutional Institutional
Duration
Portfolio
Turnover
Active
Duration
Share
6%
22%
12%
16%

64. See Brian R. Cheffins & John Armour, The Past, Present, and Future of Shareholder
Activism by Hedge Funds, 37 J. CORP. L. 51, 87 (2011).
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27%

38%

24%

33%

57%
59%

63%
67%

46%
50%

66%
69%

25,134

25,090

26,724

26,709

As shown in column 1, the R2 of regressing Institutional Duration on
year fixed effects is 6%, meaning that differences in years explain 6% of
the differences in Institutional Duration. When we calculate the R2 of
regressing Institutional Duration on industry fixed effects, the R2 estimate
increases significantly, with differences in industries explaining 27% of
the differences in Institutional Duration. The increase in R2 is even more
significant when we calculate the R2 of regressing Institutional Duration
on firm fixed effects, with differences in unobservable firm characteristics
explaining 57% of the differences in Institutional Duration. However,
when we calculate the R2 of regressing Institutional Duration on firm fixed
effects plus the set of our sixteen specific firm characteristics, the R2 only
increases from 57% to 59%. This suggests that there are no observable
firm characteristics that can uniformly predict variations in Institutional
Duration.
Results for Institutional Portfolio Duration, shown in column 2, are
similar, although generally of greater magnitude. In particular, compared
to the R2 only considering unobservable firm characteristics, the R2 of
regressing Institutional Portfolio Duration on firm fixed effects plus the
set of our sixteen firm characteristics increases only by 4% (from 63% to
67%). This confirms that employing the set of observable firm
characteristics adds relatively little to explanatory power.
Results for Institutional Turnover, shown in column 3, indicate,
again, that time-invariant firm characteristics explain most of the variation
in the presence of short-term versus long-term institutional investors.
However, the increase in the R2 we obtain when we regress Institutional
Turnover on firm fixed effects compared to the R2 we obtain using industry
fixed effects is not as significant as in the cases of Institutional Duration
and Institutional Portfolio Duration. Specifically, the R2 using industry
fixed effects is 24%, and the R2 using firm fixed effects is 46%. This result
indicates that industry related factors might play a more important role in
explaining the frequency of institutional trading than they do in explaining
institutional holding periods. Still, consistent with the results we obtain for
Institutional Duration and Institutional Portfolio Duration, when we
calculate the R2 of regressing Institutional Turnover on firm fixed effects
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plus the set of our sixteen firm characteristics, R2 registers, again, only a
4% increase (from 46% to 50%).
Results for Institutional Active Share are also similar, with
differences in time-invariant firm characteristics explaining 66% of the
differences in the activism of institutional investors and the R2 of
regressing Institutional Active Share on firm characteristics and firm fixed
effects only increasing to 69%. Therefore, as with institutional holding
periods, there seem to be no time-varying firm characteristics that have
substantial additional explanatory power for how active a stock’s
institutional investor will be relative to time-invariant firm fixed effects.
Since our firm characteristics also include staggered boards and
poison pills, these results suggest that contrary to commonly held beliefs,
the adoption of such measures does not seem to be related to the presence
of either short-term or long-term institutional investment horizons or more
or less active institutions.
B.

Individual Firm Characteristics

In order to analyze the importance at the margin of time variation in
specific firm characteristics, we next turn to more closely examine the
relationship between our set of sixteen firm characteristics and both
institutional investment horizon and activism.
To this end, in Table 2, we present pooled panel regressions (i.e.,
with firm fixed effects) of our three proxies for institutional investment
horizon (Institutional Turnover, Institutional Duration, and Institutional
Portfolio Duration in columns 1–3, respectively) and activism
(Institutional Active Share in column 4) on the set of our specific firm
characteristics.
Table 2
Institutional Investor Behavior and Firm Characteristics
This table presents regressions of three different proxies of the presence of
short-term institutions (Institutional Duration, Institutional Portfolio Duration,
and Institutional Turnover in columns 1–3, respectively) and of active institutions
(Institutional Active Share in column 4) on a large set of firm characteristics (see
text), which are lagged by one year. Each regression includes year and firm fixed
effects. The symbols *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%,
and 1% level, respectively, based on robust standard errors clustered by firm.

Tobin's Q

Institutional
Duration

Institutional
Portfolio
Duration

Institutional
Turnover

Institutional
Active Share

-0.0139**

-0.0187***

0.00674***

-0.00950***
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Staggered
Board
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(-2.57)
-0.00231

(-0.10)
Poison Pill -0.0387***
(-2.73)
Institutional -0.239**
Active
Share
(-2.17)
Institutional
Duration

(-7.70)
-0.0000306

(8.90)
-0.00405

(-12.31)
0.00334

(-0.00)
-0.0142**
(-2.54)
-0.744***

(-1.47)
0.00454***
(2.65)
0.232***

(1.08)
0.00249
(1.34)

(-15.52)

(14.47)
0.0171***
(7.62)
-0.0887***

Institutional
Portfolio
Duration

(-13.41)
0.0708***

Institutional
Turnover
Institutional -0.210***
Ownership
(-5.56)
Log(Assets) -0.00884
(-0.54)
Log(Firm 0.586***
Age)
(12.61)
Herfindahl -0.0290
Industry
(-0.74)
Sales
-0.0706***
growth
(-4.31)
Loss
0.00765
(0.80)
Debt-to-0.00767**
Equity
(-2.20)
Firm
-0.0915*
Liquidity
(-1.86)
CAPX /
-0.176
Assets
(-1.46)
R&D /
-0.00169
Assets
(-0.11)
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-0.0761***

0.00251

(6.63)
0.0272***

(-5.03)
0.0142**
(2.22)
0.150***

(0.59)
-0.0120***
(-6.42)
-0.0370***

(5.28)
-0.0173***
(-8.99)
-0.0151**

(7.50)
-0.0153

(-5.81)
0.00466

(-2.33)
-0.00511

(-0.97)
-0.0689***

(0.94)
0.0199***

(-1.03)
-0.00138

(-10.31)
0.0243***
(6.13)
-0.00264*

(7.34)
-0.00589***
(-3.70)
0.00101*

(-0.56)
0.00749***
(5.40)
0.000309

(-1.75)
-0.0245

(1.88)
0.00220

(0.57)
-0.0194**

(-1.22)
0.0808

(0.35)
-0.0551***

(-2.51)
-0.00160

(1.57)
-0.0160

(-3.14)
0.00573

(-0.09)
-0.00156

(-1.41)

(1.27)

(-0.22)
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0.0115

-0.0167

0.00698*

-0.000929

(0.39)
-0.0152

(-1.34)
-0.00541

(1.69)
-0.000117

(-0.21)
0.000408

(-1.24)
0.0181

(-1.12)
0.0145*

(-0.08)
-0.00154

(0.25)
-0.00380

(0.88)

(1.73)

(-0.60)

(-1.51)

25,119
0.588

25,075
0.670

26,709
0.501

25,071
0.711

Among the noticeable results of Table 2, we find that higher firm
value (as proxied by Tobin’s Q) predicts shorter institutional holding
periods and correspondently higher stock turnover, while also being
correlated to less activism. This seems to indicate that as a firm’s value
increases, investors trade stock more frequently, perhaps in order to
exploit profit opportunities. Economically, a standard deviation increase
in firm value (corresponding to an increase in Tobin’s Q of 1.27) is
associated with a decrease in Institutional Portfolio Duration of 0.28
months (=1.27*0.0187*12, see column 2) and with a decrease in
Institutional Active Share of 1.2% (=1.27*0.0095, see column 4).
Results concerning the adoption of defensive measures are also
noticeable. First, we find that staggered boards have no impact on any of
our measures of institutional investor behavior.
Conversely, poison pills seem to predict increased short-termism on
the side of investors, as their adoption is associated with lower
Institutional Duration, lower Institutional Portfolio Duration, and
increased Institutional Turnover. Considering that the adoption of a poison
pill is designed to block threats of a change in control, this result might
seem puzzling at first. Poison pill results, however, need to be interpreted
with caution. Indeed, since boards of directors can unilaterally adopt a pill
at any time, it is difficult to gather any inference about the use of “visible”
rather than “shadow” pills.65 Nevertheless, because boards tend to put a
pill in place when things have already gone awry, institutional investors

65. See John C. Coates IV, Takeover Defenses in the Shadow of the Pill: A Critique of the
Scientific Evidence, 79 TEX. L. REV. 271, 288 (2000) (arguing that since the endorsement of the pill
by Delaware courts, “all Delaware firms . . . have had a shadow pill in place, witting or not”).
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could interpret their adoption as a “bad” signal, which would explain why
the poison pill is associated with a shorter institutional investment horizon.
Alternatively, as we have explained elsewhere,66 the negative
association between firms with a pill in place and institutional investment
horizons could be explained by the unilateral nature of this defensive
measure. Unlike staggered boards, which require shareholder approval,
the adoption of a pill requires no dialectical confrontation with the
shareholders and, therefore, may have a higher likelihood of being
motivated by managerial moral hazard. This would explain why
institutional investors tend to react negatively to the adoption of a pill but
remain indifferent to the adoption of a staggered board.
Next, moving to the impact of having more active institutional
investors, we find that in firms with a greater Institutional Active Share,
the institutional investment horizon is considerably reduced. That is, a
greater Institutional Active Share is associated with a decrease in
Institutional Duration and Institutional Portfolio Duration and an increase
in Institutional Turnover. This result seems consistent with the claim that
increased shareholder activism is likely to exacerbate short-termist
concerns, as activism would increase the ability of investors to pressure
managers to undertake strategies with lucrative short-term projects at the
expense of long-term value. Indeed, while we develop our value analysis
in the next Part, Table 2 results seem to preliminarily indicate that the more
active a firm’s institutional investors are, the more short-term they tend to
be.
Consistently, as to the impact of the levels of institutional ownership,
we observe that higher institutional ownership levels are associated with
lower holding periods as well as greater activism. This result, thus, seems
to confirm the inference that active investors may enjoy greater bargaining
power to influence a firm’s time horizon and that this power increases with
the level of outstanding stock held by the institutional investor.
Finally, Table 2 shows that firm age is associated with longer
duration, less turnover, and less activism. A possible explanation for this
result is that investors in older firms are better positioned to gather private
information throughout the years. This positional advantage would reduce
the informational asymmetry gap between insiders and outsiders in older
firms. Under the assumption that informational asymmetry is a factor
causing investors to be more short-term-oriented, the reduced
informational asymmetry gap of older firms could then explain why
institutional investors tend to have longer investment horizons, as well as
why they tend to interfere less with management in such firms.
66. See Cremers, Masconale & Sepe, supra note 10, at 769.
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INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS AND FIRM VALUE
So far, the results of our empirical investigation indicate that more
institutional investor activism is associated with shorter institutional
holding periods and more frequent institutional trading. Further, the higher
the levels of institutional ownership, the more the institutional activism
and the shorter the institutional investment horizon. Conversely, in older
firms, we observe less activism and turnover on the one hand and longer
holding periods on the other. Still, in contrast to common theoretical
predictions, different defense measures seem to have a varying impact on
institutional investor behavior.
These results, however, do not address efficiency questions about
institutional investor behavior. In order to address these questions, in this
Part, we focus on the financial value analysis of aggregate institutional
investor behavior as interacted with corporate governance features. We do
so by estimating Tobin’s Q regressions on year and firm fixed effects,
proxies for institutional investment horizons and activism, staggered
boards, poison pills, and a set of standard controls. As shown by Table 3
below, we use different proxies for institutional investment horizons in
different columns. In columns 1–5, we use Institutional Duration; in
column 6, we use Institutional Portfolio Duration; and in column 7, we
use Institutional Turnover.
Table 3
Firm Value, Governance, and Institutional Shareholders
This table presents Tobin’s Q regressions on year and firm fixed effects,
proxies for the presence of short-term institutions (Institutional Duration,
Institutional Portfolio Duration, and Institutional Turnover), a proxy of the
presence of active institutions (Institutional Active Share), staggered boards (SB),
poison pills (PP), plus a set of standard controls.67 All independent variables are
lagged by one year. The symbols *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at
the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively, based on robust standard errors clustered
by firm.
Dependent
Variable:
Tobin’s Q
(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

67. For brevity, we do not show the controls in the Table.

(6)

(7)
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Proxy of
Institutional Duration
Investment
Horizon:
Staggered
Board

0.104** 0.0241

0.0501

0.0489

0.0542

(2.16)

(0.57)

(2.18)

(1.16)

(1.16)

(1.41)

(0.50)

(-1.90)

(-0.85)

0.0646*
*
(2.25)

(-0.45)

0.00248 0.000854

0.00210

(0.09)

(0.07)

Staggered
Board *
Proxy of
Investment
Horizon
Institutional
Active
Share *

(0.03)

0.0688** 0.252** 0.180*

0.815*

(2.36)

(1.66)

(2.44)

(1.83)

-0.0285* -0.0367** -0.00336 -0.00460

0.201

(-1.68)

(0.37)

(-2.01)

(-0.04)

(-0.05)

-0.725** -1.027
(-2.04)

Institutional
Active
Share *

Inst. Turn.

0.0275

(-1.97)

Institutional
Active
Share *
Proxy of
Investment
Horizon
Institutional
Active
Share *
Staggered
Board
Institutional
Active
Share *
Poison Pill

Inst. Portf.
Duration

0.103**

Poison Pill -0.0590** -0.0566* -0.0256 -0.0136
Staggered
Board *
Proxy of
Investment
Horizon
Poison Pill
*
Proxy of
Investment
Horizon
Institutional
Active
Share
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(-1.38)

-1.602***
(-5.21)

-0.0614 -0.0115

2.171***

(-0.30)

(-0.03)

(2.58)

-0.129

-0.559*

0.210*

(-0.89)

(-1.70)

(1.85)

-0.127

-0.102

-0.383***

(-1.03)

(-0.32)

(-2.90)

-0.308* 0.0654

-1.891**

(-1.69)

(-2.37)

(0.24)

0.00626 -0.0114

0.437
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PP * Proxy
of
Investment
Horizon
Proxy of
-0.00715 -0.0423* 0.00211 -0.0322
Investment
Horizon
(-0.32)
(-1.69) (0.09) (-1.27)

(0.03)
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(-0.04)

(0.49)

-0.0181 -0.312

-0.679

(-0.15)

(-1.32)

(-1.21)

Institutional 0.250*** 0.260** 0.250** 0.259*** 0.293** 0.275***
Ownership
*
*
*
(3.51)
(3.58) (3.51) (3.57)
(4.07) (3.87)

0.300***
(4.73)

N

24,830

23,655

24,830

23,655

23,551

23,509

26,322

R-sq

0.660

0.663

0.660

0.663

0.666

0.667

0.662

Our first finding, consistent with robust results we obtained in prior
research,68 is that the adoption of a staggered board is associated with
increased firm value. For example, the results in column 1 indicate that an
adoption or removal of a staggered board is associated with an average
increase or decrease in Tobin’s Q of 10.3%, which is economically
meaningful with an average Tobin’s Q in our sample of 1.83. Conversely,
but still consistent with our prior research,69 the adoption of the poison pill
is associated with reduced firm value. This reinforces our prior inference
that we observe shorter institutional investment horizons in firms with a
poison pill perhaps because the adoption of a unilateral defensive
mechanism, such as the pill, signals a higher likelihood of managerial
moral hazard.
Our most notable result in relation to the use of defensive measures
is that the adoption of a staggered board becomes more valuable in the
presence of patient capital, as indicated by the strongly significant positive
coefficient we obtain for Staggered Board*Proxy of Investment Horizon
in column 2 (in which we use Institutional Duration to measure
institutional holding periods). Economically, we can compare the
associated change in Tobin’s Q of adopting a staggered board for firms
with different levels of institutional investment horizon. For example,
compare a firm with average Institutional Duration (equal to 1.48 years)
to a firm where Institutional Duration is a standard deviation (0.57) higher
(equal to 1.48+0.57 = 2.05 years). The results in column 2 suggest that the
adoption of a staggered board is associated with an increase in Tobin’s Q

68. See Cremers & Sepe, supra note 8, at 100–05; Cremers, Litov & Sepe, supra note 13.
69. See Cremers, Masconale & Sepe, supra note 10, at 769, 772–74.
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of 12.3% for firms with average Institutional Duration70 and with an
increase in Tobin’s Q of 16% for firms where Institutional Duration is a
standard deviation higher.71 This result is also robust to using other proxies
of investment horizon as shown by columns 6 and 7 (respectively
documenting results for Institutional Portfolio Duration and Institutional
Turnover).
The results on the increased value of adopting a staggered board in
the presence of more patient institutional capital are, again, consistent with
the results we obtained in our prior staggered board research.72 This
research shows that the staggered board serves a constructive governance
function, as the limits it imposes on the ability of shareholders to intervene
in corporate decision-making result from mutual agreement between the
board and the shareholders.73 This function commits shareholders to
preserve a board’s authority to exploit competitive private information in
the short term when it is more likely that market prices may fail to fully
incorporate such information (and, therefore, fail to serve as an efficient
information focal point for shareholder governance interventions).74
Under this view, the fact that firms with a staggered board and more
patient investors exhibit successful financial performance confirms
staggered boards add value by ensuring that investors give managers
sufficient time to develop latent assets (that is, long-term strategies), rather
than evaluate managerial performance after relatively briefs periods of
time.
Conversely, the adoption of a poison pill continues to be negatively
associated with firm value even when combined with patient capital as
shown by the negative coefficient we obtain for Poison Pill*Proxy of
Investment Horizon in column 3 (in which we use Institutional Duration
to measure institutional holding periods). This finding provides additional
confirmation to our inference that poison pills, as unilateral devices that
are not the result of an agreement with shareholders, are more likely to
reflect managerial moral hazard.
The other major result we obtain in examining the financial value
impact of institutional investor behavior and corporate governance
features is that when investors have longer investment horizons but are
more active, the positive effect of the staggered board on firm value
decreases (although the overall effect remains positive). As shown in
column 5 (in which we use Institutional Duration to measure institutional
holding periods), the coefficient for Institutional Active Share*Staggered
70. The percentage estimated is obtained as follows: 2.75%+(0.0646*1.48) = 12.3%.
71. The percentage estimated is obtained as follows: 2.75%+(0.0646*2.05) = 16%.
72. See Cremers, Masconale & Sepe, supra note 10, at 769–71.
73. See id.
74. See id.
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Board*Proxy of Investment Horizon is negative. A possible interpretation
of this result is that when investors show signs of impatience by being
more active, the relationship between the board of directors and the
shareholders is disrupted and falls out of the equilibrium path, so the
staggered board can no longer serve a constructive function and commit
investors to the longer term.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
Our analysis of aggregate institutional investor behavior has
generated insights on the short-term versus long-term debate in corporate
governance, in addition to providing a framework for future work on
institutional investor behavior. First, our study suggests that as empirical
results need to be convincingly interpreted through theoretical
explanations, so too do theoretical predictions need to be verified through
an examination of the empirical evidence when data is available. Indeed,
far from the picture of homogenously “good” or “bad” institutional
investors commonly depicted by contenders in the short- versus long-term
debate, we find that different firm characteristics are associated with
different investor behaviors. We also find that institutional investors’
attitudes toward activism play a role in influencing investment horizon
preferences.
Second, our results call for further research into the individual classes
of institutional investors and the relationship existing between governance
features and both aggregate and individual institutional behavior. For
example, the evidence that active institutional investors exhibit more
short-term preferences seems in line with prior results we obtained on
hedge fund behavior.75 This suggests that studying the behavior of other
classes of institutional investors, such as banks, insurance companies,
mutual funds, and the like, against the benchmark of aggregate
institutional behavior could help further our understanding of the role
played by institutional ownership in the corporation’s inter-temporal
choices.
Third, our results suggest that further investigation of the dynamics
linking firm and governance characteristics to both aggregate and
individual institutional behavior could help ensure that academic
recommendations to policy makers are grounded in robust empirical
results and solid theoretical interpretations. To this respect, this Article has
focused on exploring the association between defensive measures and
aggregate institutional behavior. Empirically, it has documented that
staggered boards and poison pills have radically different implications for
75. See Cremers et al., supra note 6.
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both institutional investor behavior per se and its interacted impact on firm
value. Theoretically, it has drawn on our prior research and provided a
plausible explanation for these results, suggesting that these different
implications are a by-product of the differing nature of staggered boards
and poison pills as bilateral and unilateral defensive measures,
respectively. Extending this approach to other governance features would
be beneficial to abandoning current partisan positions and promoting
optimal solutions to the corporation’s inter-temporal issues.

